Tennessee Malicious Prosecution

 

In an opinion released today, the Tennessee Supreme Court extended its previous holdings with respect to civil defendants in Parrish v. Marquis, 172 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tenn. 2005), and Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012), and held that a criminal defendant can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused. 

 

 The plaintiff, Kenneth J. Mynatt, was elected vice president of his local union. Mr. Mynatt alleged that after he publicly criticized the union’s financial waste, its leadership accused him of misusing union funds, which ultimately led to Mr. Mynatt’s indictment on two felony charges. The criminal charges against him were later dismissed. Mr. Mynatt in turn filed an action for malicious prosecution, among other things, against the union, the local chapter, and several individuals associated with the union.

 

 The defendants in the malicious prosecution case filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Mr. Mynatt’s complaint did not establish that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor, which is an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, determining that Plaintiff “sufficiently alleged in his complaint that the underlying proceedings terminated in his favor by asserting that the charges against him were dismissed, that he was innocent of the charges, and that he entered into no deal or agreement with the prosecutor.”  The Supreme Court granted review to consider under what circumstances the dismissal of criminal charges constitutes a “favorable termination” for the purposes of a malicious prosecution claim.

 

 In its unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court considered the evolution of the favorable termination standard and specifically focused on its two relevantly recent opinions in Parrish v. Marquis and Himmelfarb v. Allain, both of which involved malicious prosecution claims stemming from an underlying civil lawsuit. The Court noted that Parrish and Himmelfarb established that a favorable termination must relate to the merits and indicate innocence. The Supreme Court further considered the notable differences between civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions and the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions. Ultimately, the Court determined that the favorable termination standard articulated in Parrish and Himmelfarb should be extended to apply to malicious prosecution actions where the underlying proceeding was criminal.  It also concluded that the prohibition in Himmelfarb precluding a fact-intensive and subjective inquiry into the reasons and circumstances leading to dispositions if civil cases also applies to dispositions of criminal cases.

 

 Thus, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused. Under this standard, the Court determined that Mr. Mynatt did not allege sufficient facts for a court to conclude that the dismissal of his criminal case was a favorable termination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s order granting the motion to dismiss.

 

 To read the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kenneth J. Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39, et al., authored by Chief Justice Roger A. Page, visit the opinions section of TNCourts.gov