Tennessee Wrongful Death and Creditor Claims

The proceeds of a wrongful death action go directly to the spouse and the other statutory beneficiaries, Kline, 69 S.W.3d at 202 n.3, and they pass free and clear of any claims of the decedent’s creditors, Anderson v. Anderson, 366 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Tenn. 1963) (citing former Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-609, currently Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-108(b)). The proceeds never become part of the decedent’s estate.  Cooper, 313 S.W.2d at 448 (“Neither the claim nor the recovery under this situation here becomes a part of the estate of deceased . . . .”); Lawson v. Lawson, No. M2009-00537-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3853289, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2010) (holding that voluntarily tendered insurance proceeds should be tendered in the wrongful death tort action, not in probate, because “the damages assessed in the wrongful death case are not a part of the decedent’s estate that pass by will but, instead, pass by statute to specified individuals”); Holliman v. McGrew, 343 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“In a wrongful death action, . . . neither the claim nor the recovery becomes a part of the estate of the deceased.”). Even when the wrongful death right of action is prosecuted in the name of the decedent’s personal representative rather than by the spouse or the other next of kin, the personal representative asserts the claim on behalf of the beneficiaries, not on behalf of the decedent or the decedent’s estate.  Johnson, 665 S.W.2d at 718 (“While an action for wrongful death, of course, may be instituted and maintained by an administrator, . . . it has long been settled that the administrator sues as a representative of the next of kin, and not as a representative of the estate or of creditors.”); Cooper, 313 S.W.2d at 448 (“[T]he personal representative as such has no interest in recovery but is only a medium for enforcing the rights of others.”).

Conflict of Law Analysis on Statute of Limitations

A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. Williams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 741 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. Miss. 2014).

In Mississippi, choice-of-law analysis arises only when there is a true conflict between the laws of two states, each having an interest in the litigation. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920 So. 2d 427, 432 (Miss. 2006).

Once a true conflict is established, Mississippi's choice of law test consists of three steps:

(1)    “[D]etermine whether the laws at issue are substantive or procedural[.]" Ellis, 625 F.3d at 225 (quotation marks omitted); accord Zurich, 920 So. 2d at 433. If they are procedural, the inquiry ends and Mississippi law applies. See Zurich, 920 So. 2d at 433.

(2)    [I]f substantive, classify the laws as either tort, property, or contract; and

(3)    look to the relevant section of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws." Ellis, 625 F.3d at 225-26.

Williams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 741 F.3d 617 (5th Cir. Miss. 2014).

Step 1: 

Is the law at issue procedural or substantive?

       

Typically, Mississippi holds a statute of limitation to be procedural in nature. However, Mississippi courts recognize “a well-established exception exists where a particular state's limitations period is considered to be part of its substantive law because the limitations period is "built in" or "in the same enactment" as the statute which creates the right of action.” Morningstar v. General Motors Corp., 847 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Miss. 1994).

Case Cites:

Mississippi follows the traditional rule that a statute of limitation is deemed "procedural" rather than "substantive." Williams v. Taylor Machinery, Inc., 529 So. 2d 606, 609 (Miss. 1988). However, a well-established exception exists where a particular state's limitations period is considered to be part of its substantive law because the limitations period is "built in" or "in the same enactment" as the statute which creates the right of action. See, e.g., Siroonian v. Textron, Inc., 844 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that in a wrongful death action brought in Mississippi court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction and applying Kentucky substantive law, Kentucky's statute of limitations is considered substantive and thus governed the case).

Morningstar v. General Motors Corp., 847 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Miss. 1994).

“[T]he law of the forum determines whether an issue in the action is substantive or procedural in nature." 1A C.J.S. Actions § 41. In Mississippi, "few laws are classified as procedural" and, for choice of law purposes, the Mississippi Supreme Court has labeled as procedural only rules of evidence and procedure, statutes of limitations, and awards of attorney's fees and interest. See Zurich, 920 So. 2d at 433.

Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. Miss. 2008).

Steps 2 and 3:

The laws at issue center around an action based in torts. Mississippi has adopted the “center of gravity” or the “significant relationship” test found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Under the center of gravity test, the relevant sections of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws are Sections 145 and 175.

Section 145 speaks to torts generally and states:

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, as to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

  (a) the place where the injury occurred,

  (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

  (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and

  (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

Section 175 specifically applies to wrongful death actions and states:

In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.

Under the center-of-gravity test, the presumption is Mississippi law, including its wrongful-death statute, will apply because the injury occurred here UNLESS another state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and parties.  

A common argument when the a party does not want the law of the state where the injury occurred to apply is to argue it was purely fortuitous that the incident happened in that state, especially in a case where the decedents were merely driving through the state. However, it appears a party still has to overcome the presumption by showing that it was merely fortuitous and another state has a more substantial relationship.

The “accrual of the action” issue:

In Mississippi, "a wrongful death claim is subject to, and limited by, the statute of limitations associated with the claims of specific wrongful acts which allegedly led to the wrongful death." Jenkins v. Pensacola Health Trust, Inc., 933 So.2d 923, 926 (P12) (Miss. 2006). The wrongful death claim accrues when the claim for the underlying wrongful conduct accrues. May v. Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp., 948 So. 2d 483 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

Under Mississippi law, when a defective product causes a wrongful death, the claim accrues when the underlying products-liability claim accrued. A cause of action accrues only when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim; that is, when the right to sue becomes vested, and the theory that an injury has to happen before a tort is considered complete. Little v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75666 (N.D. Miss. June 11, 2015). A product liability action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. Austin v. Bayer Pharms. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137480 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 25, 2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2).  So, when the injury occurs in Mississippi, such as a MVA, the claim will not have accrued outside of the state.

Additional case cites:

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has examined this issue and explained that Mississippi's choice of law rule in conflicts of law cases provides that the law of the place where the injury occurred controls unless some other state has a more significant relationship to the accident and the parties. To overcome the presumption that the law of the situs applies, [Plaintiff] must show that some other jurisdiction has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. The significance of the relationship is based on contacts. In addition to the place where the injury occurred, contacts to be considered include the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties, and the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Walls v. General Motors, Inc., 906 F.2d 143, 145-46 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Boardman v. United Services Auto. Asso., 470 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1985); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968)). Here, there is no dispute that the accident occurred in Louisiana. Moreover, the alleged acts or omissions on the part of the Defendants would have occurred or accrued, at least in part, in Louisiana. Finally, no other state appears to have more significant contacts with this action as all parties reside in different states. Thus, the contacts held by other states, including Mississippi, appear to be a wash and are no greater than Louisiana's contact as the location of the accident. Plaintiff argues however that where the location of the accident was merely fortuitous, it will not weigh in favor of applying the law of that state. While this statement is true, it is incomplete. Whether the location is fortuitous depends on other facts. Plaintiff's authority for this argument illustrates the point. In Vick v. Cochran, 316 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975), the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the location of an accident in Mississippi was fortuitous and therefore applied the law of Alabama. The court noted, "Not only do all of the parties, plaintiffs and defendant, and nine of the ten witnesses, reside at Hamilton, Alabama, but their status, and their relationships each with the other, were established under agreements, express or implied, arrived at in the State of Alabama." Id. at 246. Here, there were no pre-existing relationships and the parties all resided in different states. As such, the choice of law analysis favors Louisiana.

White v. Universal Transp., Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72193 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 2, 2006).

Kentucky was more than just the place of the injury. The Fort Campbell airfield on the Kentucky portion of the base was not only the location from which the fatal flight originated and was to have returned, it was also the military station to which both the helicopter and Sheryl Siroonian were assigned. See Price, 784 F.2d at 605. The accident occurred because Sheryl Siroonian, flying low due to reduced visibility, struck a power line rooted in Kentucky soil.

While other states have some contact with the occurrence and the parties to this action, none have a more significant relationship than Kentucky. Texas is the state in which the principal place of business of Bell is located, as well as the state where the helicopter involved in the accident was manufactured and delivered to the Army. Tennessee was the decedent's temporary residence and the location of one of the interim stops on the fatal flight. Mississippi, Siroonian's choice for applicable law, bears no relationship to either the accident or the parties to this case, other than an attenuated tie to Bell. In an effort to support his contention that Mississippi law applies, Siroonian points out that there are numerous Bell helicopters used in Mississippi, and that Textron, the parent company, has two plants in Mississippi. Neither of these plants, however, manufacture helicopters or helicopter parts. While Siroonian's argument might be relevant to a jurisdictional question, it bears little weight in the choice of law determination before us.

Kentucky was clearly both the situs of the accident and the center of the relationship of the decedent and the Bell helicopter. See id. at 604; § 145 of the Restatement, supra. Contrary to Siroonian's contention, it was not merely fortuitous that Sheryl Siroonian and the allegedly defective helicopter happened to be involved in a crash in Kentucky. While some contacts exist with other states, no other state besides Kentucky has "a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties."

Siroonian v. Textron, Inc., 844 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. Miss. 1988).

With regard to the last step, Mississippi resolves conflict-of-laws questions using the "significant relationship" test found in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971). Id. at 226;

"A court that applies the 'center of gravity' approach must determine 'which state has the most substantial contacts with the parties and the subject matter of the action.'" Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Fed. Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 214, 230-31 (5th Cir.) (quoting Boardman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 1024, 1031 (Miss. 1985)), reh'g in part on other ground granted, 423 F.3d 522 (5th Cir. 2005).

In this diversity action, the court is bound to apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum state, Mississippi, Klaxon v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 85 L. Ed. 1477, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941), and under Mississippi law, the starting point of the choice-of-law inquiry is Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509 (Miss. 1968), the case in which the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted the "center of gravity" or "most substantial contacts" conflicts-of-law test. Under the center of gravity test, section 175 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is the primary rule for wrongful death actions. See Siroonian v. Textron, Inc., 844 F.2d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 1988). That section provides: In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied (emphasis supplied).In determining the significance of the relationship or the "center of gravity," section 145 of the Restatement (Second) sets forth the following guidelines: Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to the issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred;

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative [**5] importance with respect to the particular issue.

Chapman v. Thrasher Trucking Co., 729 F. Supp. 510 (S.D. Miss. 1990)