A party who files a divorce action waives certain rights and puts their conduct and behavior in question. Just as in Rule 503 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, if a party puts their physical health in issue, the medical privilege is waived. As such by filing a divorce complaint or counterclaim, the party is waiving certain privileges.
Additionally under the legal standards for
child custody (Albright v. Albright),
alimony factors (Armstrong v. Armstrong),
and property division (Ferguson v.
Ferguson), martial fault and/or moral fitness are factors that are required
to be considered by the Court. The clean hands doctrine has long been
recognized by our Courts.
“…he
who comes into an equity court must come with clean hands. One cannot use the process of that court when
his conduct with respect to the transaction in question as been characterized
by willful inequity, illegality, and fraud.
Griffith, Miss. Chancery
Practice, (2d. ed. 1950), Section 32, 42).”
A party cannot be granted relief when refusing to be
truthful about the same. While there is
not Mississippi case on point, in the Missouri case of Franklin v. Franklin, 283 SW2d 483 (Mo. 1955), the Missouri Court
held that a spouse certainly has a right not to answer questions regarding
adultery, however by refusing to answer the same, it is justifiable to strike
their pleadings. Additionally, in a
Washington Court case, Annest v. Annest, 298
P.2d 483 (Wash. 1956), the Court found that where a party refuses to answer
questions regarding their adulterous relationship by asserting their 5th
amendment privilege, it is proper to strike their entire testimony.
This seems to be the view
adopted by the majority of jurisdictions.
If a spouse invokes a fifth amendment
privilege regarding questions about adultery, a court is free to impose a
variety of sanctions against that spouse, including the denial of affirmative
relief. E.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous,
353 So. 2d 510 (Ala. 1977) (as result of wife's claim against
self-incrimination, court was free to make any and all inferences against her
regarding substance of questions propounded); Christenson v. Christenson, 281 Minn. 507, 162 N.W.2d 194 (1968)
(after wife claimed privilege, court was free to dismiss her claim); Harwell v. Harwell, 355 S.W.2d 137 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1961) (court free to make any inferences against party claiming
privilege); Levin v. Bornstein, 13
Misc. 2d 161, 174 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 7 A.D.2d 995, 183
N.Y.S.2d 868, aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 892, 190 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1959) (court free to
impose sanctions on party who invokes fifth amendment privilege); Davis v. Davis, 233 Va. 452, 357 S.E.2d
495 (1987) (moving party in civil action who exercises privilege against
self-incrimination to refuse to answer questions pertinent to the issues
involved will have his complaint dismissed upon timely motion); Donaldson v. Donaldson, 27 Va. Cir. 327
(Fairfax County 1992) (court free to impose noncriminal sanctions on the
husband who invoked his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176
N.W.2d 292 (1970) (it was error for court not to take an adverse inference
against wife who claimed privilege). See generally Annotation, Dismissing
Action or Striking Testimony Where Party to Civil Action Asserts Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination as to Pertinent Question, 4 A.L.R.3d 545 (1965);
Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in
Private Civil Litigation, 39 Brooklyn L. Rev. 121 (1972); Madsen, Penalizing
the Civil Litigant who Invokes the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 24 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 541 (1972).
The rationale for this rule was explained in Dodson v. Dodson, 855 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). In that case,
the court stated:
“Although
a party has the right to take the Fifth Amendment against self-incrimination in
a civil case, the right is not without its price. Where a party takes the Fifth
Amendment in a dissolution action and thereby conceals pertinent information,
the party is not entitled to affirmative relief when timely objection is made.
. . . Furthermore, whether asserted by the petitioner or the respondent,
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege will, in most cases, require some
form of judicial response of a remedial nature to eliminate any undue advantage
which might flow from the ability to conceal pertinent evidence. In this
regard, the trial court is vested with discretion in fashioning an appropriate
remedy to prevent unfairness and disadvantage from the concealment of pertinent
information.”
Id. at 385; accord Mahne v.
Mahne, 66 N.J. 53, 328 A.2d 225, 227 (1974) (in civil proceedings, the
courts have, in the interest of truth and justice, displayed understandable
readiness to impose noncriminal sanctions for refusal to submit to pretrial
discovery on the basis of the privilege; thus, where the plaintiff in a civil
action refuses to testify in pretrial discovery on the grounds of
self-incrimination, it is generally held that he may be subjected to some
lesser noncriminal sanctions); Hackes v.
Hackes, 446 A.2d 396, 399 (D.C. 1982) (when a civil litigant invokes the
fifth amendment to prevent discovery, he is subject to noncriminal sanctions;
the imposition of sanctions should strike the proper balance between the public
and private interests in broad discovery, while preserving the purpose of the
privilege; striking a pleading should be the last resort).
Hope this gives you some food for thought.
No comments:
Post a Comment